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One must wonder how a technology that protects man as he ven-
tures to the moon and back cannot protect him from his ancient 
enemy, the sea. The answer lies not in logic, but in the modern 
science of economics. Drilling rigs could indeed be fabricated to 
resist any environmental force known to man; but so to construct 
them would render the venture that they are designed to service 
economically unfeasible. Thus the sea continues to claim its toll in 
lives, and those who seek to diminish that toll recognize that any 
progress that they make will merely be relative to the higher costs 
that might have been.
— Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster, Report 
Two (21)
n an attempt to stem the rising tide of panic among Louisiana’s 
restaurateurs, who, in the midst of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, were 
worried that they would be unable to serve local shellfish, British 
Petroleum representative Randy Prescott famously said that “Louisiana 
isn’t the only place that has shrimp” (qtd. in Gadbois). In addition 
to being one of the worst public relations gaffes in recent memory, 
Prescott’s comment reveals the tendency of the oil industry to treat local 
places as homogeneous sites that can be exchanged with one another, 
with little or no consequence, and illustrates the industry’s belief that 
local communities should heal quickly from the traumas caused by oil 
rig disasters. It is this neoliberal rhetoric of exchange that Lisa Moore’s 
novel February critiques in its portrayal of the sinking of the oil rig 
Ocean Ranger off the coast of Newfoundland in 1982.1
As February demonstrates, the same mentality that treats places 
solely as sites for resource extraction also treats people as exchangeable 
and dispensable. Perhaps more importantly, though, the novel shows 
how Helen’s refusal to simply get over the death of her husband resists 
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the kind of corporate amnesia that treats people and places as easily 
replaceable. In her work on modernism and the elegy, Patricia Rae con-
tends that an increasing body of scholarship recognizes the political 
and ethical potential of refusing to complete the “work” of mourning: 
At the heart of what has been called a “depathologizing” of mel-
ancholia, a movement whose recommendations extend to struggles 
with the loss of places, abstractions, and ideals, even with “the past” 
as a broad abstraction, has been a sense that such “work” amounts 
to a forgetting of, or an abdication of responsibility for, what has 
been lost, and that this amnesia has been too often demanded and 
paid in the interests of preserving the status quo. (18)
As I argue in this essay, in their rhetoric of efficiency, profit, and risk 
assessment, oil companies and governments tend to treat both people 
and places as abstractions. But in her insistence that the loss of her hus-
band is irrevocable, that her memory can provide only a fragmentary 
and incomplete re-creation of his life, and that her mourning will last 
for decades, Helen resists the status quo. Her prolonged grief suggests 
that “resistant mourning,” a concept advocated by proponents such as 
Jacques Derrida and R. Clifton Spargo, might offer the possibility of an 
ethical response to the tragedies caused by resource extraction.
Drowning in Memory
In their analyses of Newfoundland history and culture, scholars have 
long been concerned with the extent to which Newfoundlanders have 
been shaped by a series of devastating losses. According to Paul Chafe, 
Newfoundlanders are haunted by the “loss of independence, the loss 
of the cod fishery, the loss of countless lives to the sea, and the loss of 
opportunity,” and he suggests that these losses have “forged the collect-
ive psyche of Newfoundlanders and left a distinctive trace on their art 
and literature” (93). The “distinctive trace” left by loss has not necessar-
ily been viewed in a positive light, however. Scholars have argued that 
Newfoundlanders’ preoccupation with and interpretation of history 
are at best overly sentimental and nostalgic and at worst a pathological, 
melancholic, and distorted fixation.
In the f ield of l itera ry crit icism, this tendency to treat 
Newfoundlanders’ preoccupation with the past as a pathological 
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obsession began with Patrick O’Flaherty’s The Rock Observed: Studies 
in the Literature of Newfoundland (1979), the most inf luential and 
comprehensive “survey of literary responses to Newfoundland and 
Newfoundlanders over the centuries” (ix). O’Flaherty identifies two 
predominant responses to loss and environment in Newfoundland 
writing. In his insightful review of The Rock Observed, Terry Whalen 
characterizes these opposing traditions as the Romantic, or “socially 
rebellious,” and the stoic (35). According to Whalen, whereas the works 
that O’Flaherty admires possess “a quality of strong and humble sto-
icism in both the land and mindscape, a subdued and at the same time 
epic tenacity,” O’Flaherty shows “little willingness . . . to learn from the 
Romantic tradition of Newfoundland writing or from its socially rebel-
lious one. Both of these other traditions (very often related) are evoked 
only for quick dismissal” (35). 
The reception of February has resparked this discussion on the value 
of the “Romantic tradition of Newfoundland writing” (Whalen 35).2 
Like O’Flaherty, February’s detractors have treated any trace of senti-
mentality in the novel with skepticism and derision. The most promin-
ent debate took place in the pages of the National Post in July 2009, 
when columnist Barbara Kay (who, incidentally, had not read the novel 
at the time) was inexplicably incensed by Katherine Laidlaw’s “‘gushy’ 
profile of Moore” (Woods) and was inspired to write a vociferous 
response, “Unreadably Canadian.” Perhaps not surprisingly, given that 
Kay was writing in a national newspaper, she suggests that February’s 
preoccupation with the past is not a Newfoundland trait but a Canadian 
one; moreover, for Kay, as the title of her editorial indicates, the adjec-
tive “Canadian” does not evoke positive connotations: “I’m chary about 
experimenting with any Canadian author who gets a good review, espe-
cially for a novel that’s up for the Giller Prize. I’ve been burned several 
times by Giller-endorsed, but virtually unreadable CanLit. They’re all 
jumbled together in memory as feminized paeans to a sepulchral past, 
mired in poetically lyrical, but navel-gazing narrative stasis.” Perhaps 
more disturbing than her pretensions to review a novel that she has not 
read, and to assess the politics of literary prize giving and canon mak-
ing based partially on that novel, is the barely concealed misogynistic 
undertone of her piece; according to her logic, CanLit is “unreadable” 
because it is fixated on the past, a feminine (read boring and unworthy) 
topic for literature.
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For Kay, the masculine adventure novel is a more fitting genre for a 
disaster such as the Ocean Ranger: “Such a disaster is a natural fictional 
platform for an enthralling blockbuster along the lines of Sebastian 
Junger’s 1997 book The Perfect Storm.” Unfortunately, says Kay, “In 
February, typically, it serves instead as background for the novel’s actual 
subject: the feelings generated by the tragedy in the male victim’s rela-
tions.” She refers to Helen, the widowed protagonist, as a “surrogate 
victim” whom she says Moore employs to “deflect . . . attention from the 
tragedy and its male victim,” and she asks us to “imagine if, instead of 
narrating the actual drama of the 1917 Halifax explosion in his riveting 
1941 novel, Barometer Rising, Hugh MacLennan had chosen to focus, 
as we are told February does, on the ‘swelling loneliness and eventual 
letting-go’ of one woman bereft of a beloved husband in the conflagra-
tion. Zzzzzz.”3 
In sum, though Kay does not employ the word, her criticism of 
February is that it — and by extension all CanLit — is not stoic enough: 
“CanLit . . . it’s all about nobly suffering women or feminized men: men 
immobilized in situations of physical, physiological or economic impo-
tence (that is when they’re not falling through ice and nearly drown-
ing), rather than demonstrating manly courage in risk-taking or heroic 
mode.” Instead of the novel that Moore did write, Kay would rather read 
“a sympathetic narration focused on the ‘lonely and terrifying deaths’ 
of strong, psychologically unconflicted men nobly attending to work 
no woman would do, the appalling cataclysm of the oil rig’s collapse, 
an exploration of the individual lives that were cut short so horrific-
ally and, of course last and least, the impact of their loss on survivors” 
(emphasis added). As Woods suggests, “it’s impossible to take seriously 
a critic whose pre-judgements are so ingrained and politically charged,” 
and that is true: Kay’s analysis would be easily dismissed as uninformed, 
polemical tripe except that, in her tendency to privilege the stoic, and 
in her insinuation that the victims should just get over it already, her 
rhetoric echoes — and is echoed by — both popular and literary critics 
(and bears an unsettling similarity to British Petroleum’s response to the 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill not long after).
 In Canadian Notes and Queries, for example, Nathan Whitlock 
acknowledges “that ‘feminized’ is a bit of a giveaway that Kay had 
more on her agenda than mere literary engagement, and indeed Kay’s 
hobbyhorse rocks furiously into action,” and he contends that her article 
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“makes you wonder if Kay sees MacGyver novelizations as the apex of 
literary achievement.” Yet he too asks, “must every single character be 
so drowned in memory? Must every scene be so thoroughly haunted 
by the past?” Like Kay, Whitlock maintains that February is just too 
emotional, and because of the abundance of emotion he concludes that 
it is a “Highbrow Harlequin”: “February is a deeply sentimental, even 
corny novel at its heart. You should never judge a novel by its bare plot, 
but Moore can’t quite conceal the fact that her novel is about a widow 
who learns to accept her husband’s death — and even finds new love!” 
Even some of the novel’s admirers accept the terms of the debate. In 
her praise of the novel, for example, Carla Maria Lucchetta says that 
“Loneliness is hard to write about without becom[ing] maudlin or cli-
chéd. But Moore never errs on the side of sentimentality.” And Herb 
Wyile, who eloquently praises February’s “incisive understanding of the 
political and economic tensions of the province’s position in a neolib-
eral, globalized economic order,” sees Helen as a “beleaguered but stoic 
amputee” (56, 58).4
In part, this shockingly callous dismissal of “a widow who learns to 
accept her husband’s death” — and the implication that Moore should 
try to “conceal” this plot line (Whitlock) — are unfortunate continua-
tions of the tradition of disparaging “female” subject matter by sug-
gesting that it is just too emotional to be great literature. However, our 
discomfort with death and prolonged public mourning is also part of a 
larger cultural shift in Western society. According to Meghan O’Rourke, 
“Until the twentieth century, private grief and public mourning were 
allied in most cultures.” Citing the work of Philippe Ariès, she notes 
that, “Even at the turn of the twentieth century, ‘the death of a man 
still solemnly altered the space and time of a social group that could 
be extended to include the entire community.’” But shortly thereafter, 
“mourning rituals in the West began to disappear, for reasons that were 
not entirely evident.” Peter Homans attributes this decline to the deteri-
oration of community and to increasing “privatization, individualiza-
tion, and psychologization” (6).
Kay’s and Whitlock’s claim that February is just a boring story 
about a widow — a “surrogate victim” to use Kay’s phrase — and Kay’s 
insistence on establishing a rigid hierarchy of victimization reflect this 
cultural shift toward the privatization and individualization of mourn-
ing. In itself, her championing of the masculine adventure tale is not 
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particularly problematic — rollicking adventure stories do have their 
merits, after all, but Kay’s desire to isolate victims from survivors is 
based on the faulty assumption that we are separate from place, and 
disconnected from each other, and that therefore when we lose someone 
in the community we should be able to detach ourselves and move on 
with our lives quite easily.
As Moore argues in an interview with Suzannah Showler, however, 
a tragedy of this scope is imprinted in place, and its ramifications last 
“for generations”: “I wanted to show that this is not the kind of disaster 
that just hits the headlines and then goes away. This is the kind of thing 
that continues to affect people who are left behind for generations. It 
wasn’t just the loss of those men, awful as that was, it was also that 
their families were scarred. In fact, the whole province was” (“Once 
Moore”). As a result, February does not just focus on “female grief and 
loss” (Kay) in isolation but also alternates between Helen’s grief and that 
of her son, John, and shows the ripple effects of the tragedy throughout 
the community.
The impetus to treat the Ocean Ranger disaster with stoic acceptance 
is also tied to the fear that if it becomes “a debilitating psychic wound” 
— Brian Peckford’s expression for Newfoundland’s obsession with the 
past (Bannister 132) — it will impede future economic development 
and progress. As sociologist Douglas House suggests, once the Royal 
Commission reports were finished, and once the legal settlements were 
concluded, both governments and corporations expected closure: “They 
saw the Ocean Ranger disaster as extremely unfortunate but, like any 
other crisis, it was something that had to be dealt with and put out of 
the way. It was a chapter to be closed” (88). In turn, many families 
felt that the federal and provincial governments, along with Mobil and 
ODECO (the Ocean Drilling & Exploration Company), treated them 
as an inconvenience to be dealt with efficiently and expediently so that 
business could continue as usual.
Over two decades later, efforts to “close” the “chapter” on the Ocean 
Ranger disaster have proven, unfortunately, to be rather successful. As 
Moore notes, “When I went to research the book there was very little 
material information available. There was almost nothing written: just 
the Royal Commission and a few books and documentaries” (“Once 
Moore”). Two major works have appeared since Moore began research-
ing her novel, Mike Heffernan’s oral history of the disaster (2009) and 
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Susan Dodd’s The Ocean Ranger: Remaking the Promise of Oil (2012). 
Yet too often the disaster seems to be largely absent from discussions of 
the offshore oil industry’s safety record in Canada. In a lengthy front-
page Globe and Mail column following the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, for 
example, Shawn McCarthy quoted Max Ruelokke, then chair of the 
Canada-Newfoundland Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board. Ruelokke 
tried to distinguish BP’s actions in the United States from the practices 
of offshore drilling in Canada: “[I]t appears BP employed question-
able drilling methods that would not be condoned in the Canadian 
offshore,” he remarked, maintaining that in Canada “the sector has an 
outstanding safety record”; however, he did not mention the number of 
injuries sustained since offshore drilling began, the deaths of the men 
on Cougar Flight 491 in 2009, or the Ocean Ranger tragedy. Moreover, 
there is a great deal of speculation about whether the industry does have 
a good safety record and about whether it is prepared to prevent future 
disasters. Although Ruelokke claimed that Canadian regulations are far 
stronger than American ones, according to Thomas Walkom, “American 
regulation of the offshore oil industry has been revealed as a sham. Our 
regulation of drilling in the far harsher North Atlantic and Arctic is 
said by experts to be even weaker.” Such claims raise questions about 
the continued safety of both people and place in the current regulatory 
environment.
Going Overboard
Wendell Berry argues that there is an explicit link between treating 
places primarily as sites for resource extraction and treating people like 
exchangeable parts. This kind of “commodified speech,” says Berry, is 
the “chief instrument of economic and political power,” and it is prob-
lematic because it skews our values:
As [American writer] Guy Davenport saw it, nothing now exists 
that is so valuable as whatever theoretically might replace it. Every 
place must anticipate the approach of the bulldozer. No place is free 
of the threat implied in such phrases as “economic growth,” “job 
creation,” “natural resources,” “human capital,” “bringing in indus-
try,” even “bringing in culture” — as if every place is adequately 
identified as “the environment” and its people as readily replaceable 
parts of a machine. (“American Imagination” 21)
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Of course, speaking in generalizations and abstractions is not inherently 
a bad thing. But for Berry, generalization without particularization is 
unethical: “But generalization alone, without the countervailing, par-
ticularizing power of imagination, is dehumanizing and destructive” 
(33). In February, Helen’s response to inquiries about her compensation 
for her husband’s death is a poignant reminder of the “dehumanizing” 
potential of “commodified speech” and of the violence of a rhetoric of 
abstraction not balanced by particularization:
People who want to know about the settlement seem to think a 
life has a figure attached to it. A leg is worth what? An arm? A 
torso? What if you lose a whole husband? What kind of money do 
you get for that? They think a husband amounts to a sum. A dead 
husband does not add up to an amount, Helen is tempted to tell 
these people. (20)
These graphic images of dismemberment make it clear that people are 
not the sum of their parts and that to speak of people as “readily replace-
able parts of a machine” is morally repugnant.
However, the idea that people and places are exchangeable, like parts 
of a machine, has become common in an age when we prioritize effi-
ciency and profit. The subordination of place to time and space led to 
what Bill McKibben refers to as “the efficiency revolution” (7) or what 
Janice Stein calls “the cult of efficiency” (7). Stein maintains that “effi-
ciency, when it is understood correctly as the best possible use of scarce 
resources to achieve a valued end, is undoubtedly important” (6). The 
problem with current discussions of efficiency, however, is that they 
treat it as “an end in itself, a value often more important than others” 
(3).
Stein argues that this transformation of efficiency from a means 
to an end “misuses language,” transforms efficiency into a cult, and 
affects how we imagine “public life” (3, 4). Moreover, the “misuse” 
of language has a moral component; to put it in Berry’s words, “the 
reclassification of the world from creature to machine must involve at 
least a perilous reduction of moral complexity” (Life 8). Moore, in her 
tongue-in-cheek portrayal of John’s interview with Shoreline Group, “an 
efficiency agency” that works for corporations such as Shell and Mobil 
(February 136), satirizes the tendency of the oil industry to treat effi-
ciency with a cult-like reverence, and she critiques the “perilous reduc-
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tion of moral complexity” that results from its “misuse” of language: 
“Shoreline Group specialized in risk assessment, organizational restruc-
turing. They specialized in all the touchy-feely stuff from the 1980s: lat-
eral thinking, creativity in the workplace, psychological support during 
downsizing or natural disaster, pink slips, sweater-vests and distressed 
denim, a bold new self-generating speak that boiled over and reduced 
to a single, perfect word: efficiency” (130). Although the “sweater vests,” 
“distressed denim,” and “touchy-feely stuff” are supposed to convey a 
sense of humanity, they really amount to corporate speak for one value 
and one value only: efficiency.
Stein contends that, in recent years, this rhetoric of efficiency has 
been increasingly used “to promote values that lie largely outside the 
parameters of the market,” and this shift has profoundly altered our 
notion of community (13). Whereas efficiency was once understood as a 
means to achieve community, the logic has been reversed — community 
is now perceived as a means to achieve efficiency (14). It is this perver-
sion of logic that Helen questions in her critique of the oil companies’ 
rhetoric of “risk assessment” and “the public good”:
   The oil companies were all about acceptable levels of risk and 
they always had been. They spoke of possible faults in the system 
and how to avoid them.
   . . . They asked the public to consider the overall good to be 
achieved when we do take risks. They spoke in that back-assed way 
and what they meant was: If you don’t do the job, we’ll give it to 
someone who will.
   They meant: There’s money to be made.
   They meant: We will develop the economy.
   They meant there isn’t any risk, so shut the fuck up about it. 
Except they didn’t say fuck, they said: Consider the overall public 
good. (118)
Moore’s use of apophasis — listing what the companies do not say — 
and her repetition of “they meant” emphasize the discrepancy between 
what the oil companies say and what their sanitized speech actually 
signifies. In their discussion of “public good,” the oil companies are 
speaking not “the language of community” but “the language of the 
market,” which means that, in reality, their rhetoric has nothing to do 
with the public or with the good (Stein 14). For oil companies, “public 
good” equals profit, and this rhetoric of profit reinforces their cult-like 
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dogma of economic growth as an end in itself. Moreover, their calcula-
tions of “acceptable levels of risk” are based on the arrogant assumption 
that we can determine the value of human life — an assumption that 
amounts to the “perilous reduction of moral complexity” of which Berry 
speaks (Life 8).
This passage is followed by Helen’s memory of discovering her preg-
nancy, described, ironically, using the language of “risk assessment”:
Helen had not for a minute thought she was pregnant. She hardly 
knew Cal (although she knew everything important). She hadn’t 
thought it was at all probable that she would fall in love. Love was 
a fault she could easily have avoided if she (1) hadn’t been tipsy; (2) 
knew about risk assessment then and all the ways to avoid risk; (3) 
wasn’t in love already. (118-19)
Such a jarring juxtaposition between the language of love and the lan-
guage of efficiency emphasizes the inappropriateness of using “the lan-
guage of the market” outside the marketplace and leads us to question 
whether this type of rhetoric ought to be used “to promote values that lie 
largely outside the parameters of the market” (Stein 13). Furthermore, 
it compels us to ask what it is that we value, and it suggests (to bor-
row the words of Edward Luttwak) that “because everything that we 
value in human life is within the realm of inefficiency — love, family, 
attachment, community, culture, old habits, comfortable old shoes” — 
we really “ought to have only as much market efficiency as [we] need” 
(qtd. in Stein 1).
In addition to changing the way in which we perceive ourselves and 
our relationships with others, the “mechanical worldview” also pro-
foundly changed our relationship with place: “The development and 
refinement of machines extended the horizon of human possibilities, 
first to control and then to master nature, and enabled a discussion of 
efficiency as increasing productivity, as an almost limitless capacity to 
produce more and more at the same cost” (Stein 18). John’s compari-
son between Shoreline Group and his previous employer, an oil indus-
try sales company, highlights the connection among the “mechanical 
worldview,” the desire to dominate nature, and the incessant drive to 
maximize efficiency and minimize cost. In his previous job, “John had 
sold a shitload of drill bits, and the line his company gave was all about 
penetration. The terminology was sexual and violent: The bits were hard 
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and the sea floor was wet and it resisted and finally gave, and there was 
nothing a good bit couldn’t penetrate” (139). As ecofeminists such as 
Annette Kolodny argue, “gendering the land as feminine” (8) allowed 
early American colonists “to experience the New World landscape” as 
“an object of domination” (5), and it was one way of making the land 
less “threatening, alien, and potentially emasculating” (9). Likewise, 
the oil industry’s rapacious rhetoric of violent penetration represents 
an attempt to dominate and subdue the newest frontier of exploration: 
the seascape.
For Berry, “the idea that the world, its creatures, and all the parts 
of its creatures are machines” is problematic precisely because it “insti-
tutionalizes the human wish, or the sin of wishing, that life might be, 
or might be made to be, predictable” (Life 6). And, as the loss of life 
and limb on the oil rigs in February illustrates, our belief that we can 
manage nature efficiently, or make it “predictable,” is hubris. As John 
observes during his helicopter crash simulation, even with the advan-
ces in technology and safety training since the Ocean Ranger disaster, 
working on an oil rig in the middle of the ocean, and travelling to get 
there, are still incredibly perilous: “No man would ever survive the 
North Atlantic for more than five minutes without a survival suit that 
fit properly, even if he could swim. And the chances of surviving a heli-
copter crash, even with the suit, were next to nothing. Every man knew 
that” (185). The real-life crash of Cougar Flight 491 on 12 March 2009 
while on its way to the Hibernia platform, which resulted in the deaths 
of seventeen men (all but one of the men onboard), was an unfortunate 
reminder of the truth of this sentiment.
This illusion of mastery over nature is predicated on the faulty 
notion that we are separate from environment, and, according to Arnold 
Berleant, our false perception that we are detached from place leads 
to the “domination and exploitation” of environment (5).5 Moreover, 
this false perception influences not just our treatment of environment 
but also our treatment of each other: “Because of the central place of 
the human factor, an aesthetics of environment profoundly affects our 
moral understanding of human relationships and our social ethics” (12-
13). In other words, our ethical treatment of each other is grounded in 
our implacement, to use philosopher Edward Casey’s expression.
The idea that ethics are grounded in place is not a new one, Casey 
argues: “Both ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ go back to Greek words that signify 
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place: polis and ethea, ‘city-state’ and ‘habitats,’ respectively. The very 
word ‘society’ stems from socius, signifying ‘sharing’ — and sharing is 
done in a common place” (Fate xiv). In its original conception, efficiency, 
along with its ethical foundation, was also rooted in place and commun-
ity. Tracing the etymology of the word back to the ancient Greeks, and 
to Plato’s belief that the ideal state was achieved by a division of labour 
that enabled each citizen to “perform . . . the most efficient role in soci-
ety,” Stein contends that accountability, “of citizens to the polis . . . and 
of the polis to its citizens,” is a crucial aspect of the Platonic model of 
efficiency (17). In other words, for Plato, efficiency was predicated on 
place attachment and on the idea that we are connected to one another 
in place.
Oil corporations are as obsessed with efficiency as were the govern-
ments of Plato’s day, but unlike the polis, which was accountable to its 
citizens, multinational corporations have no local place attachment, 
and as a result they lack a sense of reciprocity with and accountabil-
ity to local citizens. That the oil industry’s lack of place attachment 
“profoundly impacts” its “moral understanding of human relationships 
and social ethics” and disrupts its sense of accountability can be seen 
in Moore’s portrayal of how “the families were informed” — or rather 
not informed — of the deaths of their loved ones on the Ocean Ranger:
   That’s the way the families were informed: It’s on the radio. Turn 
on the radio. Nobody from the oil company called.
   What must have happened was this: the men had not been dead 
an hour and the company had public relations on it. They had 
lawyers. Helen can imagine the meeting in the boardroom. Or 
maybe it happened all on the phone. She can imagine the kind of 
language employed.
   Or there was horror. Of course there was horror and it had 
numbed them. When did words like situation enter the vocabulary? 
Because Helen believes they thought of it that way. She believes 
they all wanted to manage the situation. (February 268)
Helen tries to imagine various reasons why the company failed to 
inform the families personally, but each time she is stumped: 
   But Helen can get no further. Because how did they get to the 
idea Let’s not phone the families. 
   How did they come up with that? 
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   And further: How was such an idea spoken aloud, given form, 
enunciated? (269). 
That the company made no effort at personal contact with the families 
— and that it dealt with the deaths of its employees at arm’s length 
through lawyers, public relations people, and management rhetoric — 
are so appalling to Helen that she cannot fathom such an approach.
One of the novel’s main criticisms of the oil industry, and the econ-
omy on which it is based, is that they disrupt genuine human attach-
ments to place. The trauma of losing her husband, for example, causes 
Helen to feel displaced and exiled within her own home: “She was out-
side. The best way to describe what she felt: She was banished. Banished 
from everyone, and from herself ” (13). In the midst of her grief, she 
feels detached and disconnected from “the world”: “By outside Helen 
meant that there was a transparent wall, a partition between her and 
the world” (20). Despite her grief, however, she makes every effort to 
maintain a normal home for her children and to mitigate their feelings 
of grief and displacement:
   Helen wanted the children to think she was on the inside, with 
them. The outside was an ugly truth she planned to keep to herself.
   It was an elaborate piece of theatre, this lying about the true state 
of where she was: outside.
   She pretended by making breakfast and supper (though she often 
relied on chicken nuggets and frozen pizza) and she did the chil-
dren’s homework with them. (13-14)
For all her best efforts, however, Helen is unable to keep the “ugly 
truth” of “the outside” all “to herself”; her children, to varying degrees, 
reveal signs that they too feel displaced by the loss of their father.
Although Helen tries to provide a stable home for the children, Cal’s 
death has a profound effect on John, and, not surprisingly, it disrupts 
his sense of order and stability. He is haunted by nightmares (92); he 
suffers from chronic stomach aches (17-18); he develops nervous habits 
(14); and, at the tender age of ten, he believes that he needs to become 
the man of the house (16). Perhaps even more devastating, though, 
is the effect that Cal’s death has on John’s ability to form romantic 
attachments in his adult life. Having witnessed his mother’s grief fol-
lowing the loss of her husband, John believes that allowing himself to 
fall in love is too dangerous: “How foolish his parents were to love like 
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that. How foolish to have so many children. They had no money. He 
wants to ask his mother, What were you thinking? . . . Why did you 
love each other so much? It destroyed you. Don’t give that much, he 
wants to say. People don’t have to give that much” (107). John thinks of 
romantic love in terms of risk assessment and is so devoted to the idea 
of averting heartache and remaining in control of his emotions that he 
dodges fatherhood like the plague: “John has avoided being a father all 
his adult life. . . . He has practised withdrawal. He has kept what he 
wants, what he actually wants for his life, in the centre of his thoughts 
even while in the throes of orgasm. He’s kept a tight fist on the reins of 
himself” (238). That, while on a business trip to Iceland, he impregnates 
a graduate student named Jane (who, ironically, studies homelessness) 
illustrates that the “withdrawal” method is as ineffective a model for 
human relationships as it is a form of birth control. And the idea that 
we can master and control nature is proven yet again to be an illusion.
The Wall of Water
As I have argued, the actions of the oil industry are unethical not only 
because they lead to displacement and detachment among people, and 
between people and place, but also because they disregard the particu-
larities of people and place. For Berry, ethics are grounded not just in 
place but also in the recognition that people, places, and events are 
unique and non-exchangeable (“American Imagination” 32-33). Belief 
in the uniqueness of people and places is also one of the key justi-
fications for what Spargo variously refers to as “a resistant strain of 
mourning” (6), “unresolved mourning” (6), or “melancholia” (11), and 
it forms the basis of Helen’s ethics of mourning in February. Spargo’s 
writings, says Rae, are part of a body of scholarship that contests Freud’s 
pathologization of melancholia, which stems back to his inf luential 
essay “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917). In this essay, Freud attempts 
to describe melancholia, the phenomenon that we might now call 
depression, by comparing it to the “normal affect of mourning” (243). 
According to Freud, the symptoms of both mourning and melancholia 
are almost identical; both entail “profoundly painful dejection, cessation 
of interest in the outside world, loss of capacity to love, and inhibition 
of all activity” (244). However, there are some key differences between 
mourning and melancholia: whereas mourners complete the “work of 
mourning” (244) over a period of time, by detaching their “libido” from 
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the lost beloved so that their ego becomes free to love other people or 
things (244-45), in melancholics the detachment process goes awry. 
Rather than “displac[ing]” their libido onto something new, they “estab-
lish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object” (249). Such 
an identification accounts for the melancholic’s prolonged feelings of 
worthlessness, a symptom not present in mourners (244, 249). In later 
work, Freud revised this model of mourning, which he admitted was 
based on limited evidence and which he had actually cautioned against 
using to make general conclusions (243). In “The Ego and the Id” 
(1923), for example, Freud argues that normal mourning might include 
the continued identification of the ego with lost objects (in a process 
that he calls “introjection”), and he suggests that it is precisely this iden-
tification with those whom we have lost that plays a key role in forming 
our individual characters (3962). Nevertheless, for nearly a century, his 
initial model of healthy mourning, predicated on “the detachment of 
libidinal ties from the deceased love object,” has predominated among 
psychologists (Baker 55).
Although Freud’s “naturalization of melancholia implicitly challen-
ges [his] initial program for healthy mourning by rendering it impos-
sible,” proponents of the resistant strain of mourning, such as Spargo, 
argue that this challenge does not go far enough (Rae 18, 16). Rather 
than acknowledge that in the grieving process there will be “inevitable 
lacks,” they make “a deliberate decision about how not to respond to 
loss” (16). In other words, says Rae, their work “might be characterized, 
in general, as a resistance to reconciliation, full stop: a refusal to accept 
the acceptance of loss” (16-17). Building on the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas and Bernard Williams, Spargo contends that the refusal to 
complete the work of mourning — whether in literary representations 
or in real life — demonstrates an ethical concern for others. We feel 
pathos when we see or read about another’s death, says Spargo, because 
we imagine that we might have done something to prevent it (3). In this 
sense, our prolonged grief can “function . . . as a belated act of protec-
tion,” in which we develop “a fantasy about agency”: had we only known 
what was going to happen, “and achieved a proper state of preparedness, 
harm might never have come to the other” (25).
In her obsessive recitation of the events leading up to the sinking of 
the oil rig, Helen demonstrates this “belated” “fantasy about agency” 
and “preparedness.” She repeatedly imagines what happened the night 
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of the disaster: “A wave of ice hit the window and it smashed. The metal 
lid had not been drawn shut over the glass, as it should have been, and 
the window smashed and water got over the electric panel and short-
circuited it. The men had to operate the ballast doors manually and they 
didn’t know how” (148-49). But Helen also repeatedly envisions what 
might have happened to Cal and the other men on board had things 
been done differently: “Helen has memorized the ifs and she can rhyme 
them off like the rosary. If the men had the information they needed, if 
they had lowered the deadlight, if the water hadn’t short-circuited the 
control panel, if Cal had had another shift, if Cal had never gotten the 
job in the first place” (293-94).
Moore’s complex narrative technique also compels readers to pic-
ture alternative scenarios and draws them into Helen’s “fantasy about 
agency” (Spargo 25). Moore alternates between a third-person, limited-
omniscient narrative — focalized through Helen’s eyes — and a dis-
armingly direct, second-person narrative also focalized through Helen. 
After recounting the sequence of events the night of the disaster, for 
example, Helen asks us to envision that one of the operators was going 
to read the manual and thus would have known what to do when the 
portal smashed:
Imagine instead a man with his feet up — for the sake of argument 
— and a cup of coffee cradled near his crotch, and maybe he’s read-
ing the manual. For the sake of argument: he has a manual open on 
his lap, and he’s going to place a call later to his wife, and he’s also 
got a book. It’s a long shift. Later on he will read the book. (149)
By addressing the reader directly, and by continually demanding that 
“we” need to reconstruct the disaster — “Do we know what they had 
on the rig for supper that night?”; “we should think about the manual. 
We should think about the portal” — Moore encourages us to assume 
collective responsibility for the disaster and for imagining alternative 
possibilities (149; emphasis added).
Yet Moore also makes it clear that, no matter how many alterna-
tive scenarios we might imagine along with Helen, we cannot save the 
men on the Ocean Ranger or prevent the negligence that has already 
occurred:
142 Scl/Élc
   The man in the control room has got the cup of instant coffee and 
he’s reading the manual, but here’s the thing: the manual didn’t say 
how to control the ballast if there was an electrical malfunction.
   So he can read the manual all he wants.
   He can read it backwards if he wants. Or he can read it in 
Japanese. It’s never going to tell him what to do. 
   And so the water from the broken portal hits the electrical panel 
and short-circuits it. (152)
That we acknowledge the limitations of the fantasy is important, 
because it is impossible to bring the men back from the dead. As Spargo 
suggests, the elegy portrays a “mission of impossible protectiveness” (13). 
Nevertheless, the failed fantasy is “meaningful” and ethical “because 
it typically persists beyond this case to analogous cases in the future: 
it translates into a commitment to preventing others from meeting a 
similar fate” (Rae 18).
In her dedication to reading the Royal Commission reports, and to 
memorizing where the brass rods go, Helen illustrates how the “fantasy 
of retroactive agency” might “translate . . . into a commitment to pre-
venting others from meeting a similar fate” even though it is “unreal-
istic” (Rae 18):
   Those brass rods. Nobody knew how to use the brass rods. If 
they’d known, the rig wouldn’t have sunk. She has learned. Helen 
has read the reports; she has studied the diagrams; she knows where 
the rods go and why and how. Because those men didn’t know and 
they didn’t know, they didn’t know, and it could happen to any 
one of us.
   You might get attacked by a fist through a window and you can 
bet Helen is ready. (Moore, February 152)
Her preparation is hypothetical, “of course,” since it is highly unlikely 
that she will ever find herself on a sinking oil rig and since — even if 
she did — the odds that it would sink in the same way are slim to nil. 
But her “fantasy” serves an important rhetorical function neverthe-
less; Spargo argues that the “unrealistic response of the mourner who 
refuses to accept the other’s death stands for an ethical protest against 
a dominant cultural pathology that trivializes death” (21). Likewise, 
Helen’s efforts to imagine a different ending to the Ocean Ranger dis-
aster amount to “an ethical protest” against an industry — and an 
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economy — that treat people and places as objects that can be valued 
and exchanged.
Whereas Spargo urges us to be wary of the societal imperative to 
get over loss quickly, because it also entails relinquishing the fantasy 
that we are responsible for, and might have prevented — or might still 
prevent — the death of another (37), Derrida challenges Freud’s model 
of mourning, “including the line of thinking that accepts and affirms 
the introjection of lost loved ones,” because he sees it as “a failure to 
respect what death really means” (Rae 17). Although we might find it 
comforting to imagine that the dead have become a part of us, ultim-
ately Derrida sees it as “unfaithful” to fool ourselves “into believing 
that the other living in us is living in himself” (qtd. in Rae 17). In order 
to remain faithful to the dearly departed, we must acknowledge the 
impossibility of fully “interioriz[ing] the other,” even as we try to “bear” 
the other “in us”; this impossibility means that, paradoxically, failed 
interiorization is actually a success (Derrida 35). So, while we might 
hold the memory of lost loved ones close to us, ethical mourning, says 
Derrida, requires “an aborted interiorization,” “a respect for the other 
as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement of renunciation which 
leaves the other alone, outside, over there, in his death, outside of us” 
(35). The process of Helen’s incomplete mourning, which begins with 
her attempts to “interiorize” Cal and ends in “an aborted interioriza-
tion,” reflects this kind of successful failure. Moreover, in her stubborn 
assertion, “Let me tell you something: There are things you don’t get 
over” (Moore, February 68), her mourning might be characterized as 
resistant in the Derridean sense.
Unlike many of the family members of the Ocean Ranger victims, 
Helen believes her husband to be dead as soon as she learns that the oil 
rig sank: “It took three days to be certain the men were all dead. People 
hoped for three days. Some people did. Not Helen. She knew they 
were gone, and it wasn’t fair that she knew” (7). She cannot stay at the 
community mass, which “they didn’t call . . . a memorial service” and 
at which “no reference was made to the men being dead” (7), because 
she cannot bear to be around the hopes of the other families, which 
she believes to be delusional: “Here’s why Helen left the church in the 
middle of the mass: Some of those people were full of hope. Insane with 
it, and the lore is that hope can bring lost sailors home. That’s the lore. 
Hope can raise the dead if you have enough of it” (13).
144 Scl/Élc
Although Helen rejects the notion that “hope can raise the dead,” 
and although she believes in the “finality of” (Derrida 35) Cal’s death, 
she remains devoted to Cal and his memory: “That must be part of 
what they decided: If Cal died out there on the rig, Helen would never 
forget him. That was the promise. She will never forget him” (Moore, 
February 302). This devotion manifests itself in two key ways: first, 
in a desire to recover his body: “She wanted his body. She remembers 
that. She knew he was dead and how badly she wanted his body” (13); 
second, in a recurring desire to embody Cal during the disaster: “But she 
wants to be in Cal’s skin when the rig is sinking. She wants to be there 
with him” (70). In a slight twist on Derrida’s idea that, when we lose 
somebody, “we grieve for him and bear him in us” (35), Helen imagines 
herself becoming a part of Cal, but she also imagines that his fear while 
the rig was going down has become a part of her: “Helen is in his skin. 
She is Cal and she lives through this every night, or sometimes in an 
instant as she cleans the dishes. . . . [I]t is an absolute terror that she 
wakes to every night. A terror that has invested itself in the microfila-
ments of her being, in every strand and particle of thought” (300). In 
embodying his fear, Helen “bears the other and constitutes him in” her 
(Derrida 35). However, her attempts to “interiorize” Cal, to carry him 
within her, ultimately end in the “sort of tender rejection” of which 
Derrida speaks (35). Although Helen believes that she “is in his skin” 
(300), and although “she lives through the disaster every night of her 
life” (70), she realizes that, paradoxically, she “is there with him. But she 
is not there, because nobody can be there” (300). For Helen, that Cal 
was alone when he died is the most difficult thing to accept:
What Helen cannot fathom or forgive: We are alone in death. Of 
course we are alone. It is a solitude so refined we cannot experience 
it while we are alive; it is too rarefied, too potent. It is a drug, that 
solitude, an immediate addiction. A profound selfishness, so full 
of self it is an immolation of all that came before. Cal was alone 
in that cold. Utterly alone, and that was death. That, finally, was 
death. (292)
For Derrida, though, it is this “movement of renunciation which leaves 
the other alone, outside, over there, in his death, outside of us” (35) that 
— to borrow Rae’s words — “fuses a sense of intimacy with a very real 
sense of the finality of . . . death” and makes the “refusal to mourn” an 
ethical act (17).
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Just as Helen’s efforts to imagine Cal’s death ultimately result in her 
realization that there will always be an aporia, so too do her attempts to 
reconstruct the disaster:
   The Royal Commission said there was a fatal chain of events that 
could have been avoided but for the inadequate training of person-
nel, lack of manuals and technical information. And that is the true 
story. It is the company’s fault.
   But there is also the obdurate wall of water, and because of it 
Helen will finally give up her careful recital of the fatal chain of 
events. (301)
There is no doubt that the company was responsible for its negligence. 
As Berleant would say, there is a reciprocal relationship between people 
and place, and the company’s actions — and inactions — contributed 
to the disaster. However, to blame only the company for the sinking of 
the rig would be to succumb to the illusion that complete mastery over 
the environment is possible. But the “obdurate wall of water” — the 
image of the wave that smashed the portal window and a metaphor for 
death — illustrates the fallacy and hubris of this illusion; as the Royal 
Commission observed, “the sea cannot be conquered” (Report Two 31). 
As Moore suggests, “the true story” is that “[i]t is the company’s fault. 
But there is also the . . . wall of water.” Human agency cannot be separ-
ated from nature.
Although Helen “finally give[s] up her” attempts to reconstruct the 
disaster, and although the final scene suggests that Cal’s death will 
always “leave a definite shadow” over their lives, February is a novel nei-
ther of despair nor of stoic acceptance (306). In the words of Tennyson’s 
Ulysses, “Tho’ much is taken, much abides” (65). As a homeless man 
tells Jane of his novel, in a rather playful (and pointed) metafictional 
moment, “This is a book about redemption” (Moore, February 264). 
It is also, as Sylvia Brownrigg contends, a book about “renewal” (8). 
Indeed, the ending — with Helen’s wedding to Barry, the man who 
renovates her house, their honeymoon in Mexico, and the birth of John’s 
baby — befits the conventions of a comedy more than those of a tra-
gedy, a move that Moore says was deliberate: “When someone dies, in 
order to honour their life you have to live joyfully” (“Once Moore”).
The ending, with its emphasis on the motif of cycles of return — of 
the sun, of the waves, of Barry to Helen, and of John, Jane, and their 
baby to St. John’s — also suggests that sometimes “to go forward” you 
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have to go back. According to Berry, “in all our attempts to renew or 
correct ourselves, to shake off despair and have hope, our starting place 
is always and only our experience. We can begin (and we must always 
be beginning) only where our history has so far brought us, with what 
we have done” (Life 4). It is only by returning to the loss of the Ocean 
Ranger disaster, then, and only by reflecting on “where . . . history has 
so far brought” Newfoundland, that Newfoundlanders might find the 
answer to the question posed by John to his mother at the beginning 
of February: “Have you ever tried to figure out the difference between 
what you are, he said, and what you have to become?” (5).
Moreover, in February, Helen’s resistant mourning suggests that, 
“to refind place” (Casey, Getting Back iv), we might need to reorient 
ourselves and our values. To be ethical, this reorientation necessitates 
“deep political changes away from hierarchy and its exercise of power 
and toward community” (Berleant 5). In other words, we need to move 
“away” from an understanding of people and places as abstractions to 
be exchanged in the market economy and “away” from efficiency as “an 
end in itself, a value often more important than others” (Stein 3), and 
“toward” those things that Luttwak suggested were invaluable — the 
very things about which we are sentimental — “love, family, attach-
ment, community, culture” (qtd. in Stein 1).
Notes
1 As the Royal Commission report summarized, “Early on the morning of February 
15, 1982, the semisubmersible drilling unit Ocean Ranger capsized and sank on the Grand 
Banks, 179 nautical miles east of St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada. The entire 84-man 
crew was lost in this disaster. Of the 69 Canadian crew members, 56 were residents of 
Newfoundland and the shock wave created by the loss was felt particularly throughout the 
province” (Report One iii).
2 Whalen identifies the “Romantic tradition” with sentimentality. In other words, he 
treats “Romantic” and “romantic” as synonymous terms.
3 Apparently, Kay has not read Barometer Rising either, or perhaps it has also become 
“jumbled together in [her] memory,” since she neglects to mention that it actually is a 
romance, much of which focuses on the feelings of a woman who is unsure whether or not 
her lover died in the war.
4 Alaa Alghamdi’s article on gendered work and on Helen’s search for a vocation fol-
lowing her husband’s death is an exception to the rule. Avoiding the debate over the value 
of stoicism or sentimentality altogether, Alghamdi argues that February traces Helen’s 
transformation “from bewilderment and grief following her husband’s death to increasing 
acceptance and self-actualization” (48).
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5 Berleant, who calls for “a major conceptual shift” in “the ecological conception of 
environment,” argues that much of our language is problematic because it implies our 
detachment from place (Aesthetics of Environment 4). He refuses to speak of “‘the’ environ-
ment,” for example, because although “this is the usual locution, it embodies a hidden 
meaning that is the source of much of our difficulty. For ‘the’ environment objectifies 
environment; it turns it into an entity that we can think of and deal with as if it were outside 
and independent of ourselves” (3-4).
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